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"Glocalizing" Chinese Higher Education:
Groping for Stones to Cross the River,
HEIDI Ross* AND JINGJING Lou**
INTRODUCTION
Over two and one-half decades have passed since Deng Xiaoping pro-
claimed that Chinese education must face in "three directions"-toward mod-
ernization, the world, and the future.' At that time leaders had yet to articulate
the driving purpose of reform as the creation of a robust market integrated with
the global economy. Today Chinese educators and policymakers use "globaliza-
tion" rather than modernization to approximate the pedagogical and social
means (including cultivating a citizenship capable of creativity, flexibility, inde-
pendent thinking, and innovation) they believe will ensure China's engagement
in an international knowledge economy.2 In response, Chinese universities grapple
with how to shape institutional frameworks that fit the social, political, eco-
nomic, and intellectual contours of this evolving context.
Most Chinese commentators have jumped on the globalization bandwagon,
praising globalization for injecting into education a forward-looking "Olympic
spirit." Some, however, describe the impact of globalization on education more
cautiously, using a Chinese proverb, "groping for stones to cross the river." We
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I. HEIDI A. Ross, CHINA LEARNS ENGLISH 8 (1993).
2. See, e.g., CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION: EDUCATIONAL REFORMS AND CHANGING
GOVERNANCE IN CHINESE SOCIETIES (Mok Ka-Ho ed., 2003) (The University of Hong Kong Com-
parative Education Research Centre, Studies in Comparative Education 13) [hereinafter CEN-
TRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION].
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see in this proverb an apt metaphor for the tentative searching on the part of Chi-
nese higher education for a firm foothold in a globalizing world. The proverb also
alludes to a number of contemporary metaphors for dislocation and economic
change, such as diving into or crossing dangerous waters. Such images may rep-
resent the outward-looking, risk-taking, profit-seeking values associated with
China's goal of "connecting" with the world.
Our paper offers a modest response to challenges set by two comparative
educators who have contributed to our understanding of education and global-
ization processes. First, Nelly Stromquist has asked, "How can we apply the
theory and knowledge of unfolding globalization developments to create an un-
derstanding of new educational phenomena?"' We begin with that application
in our examination of higher education reforms in China. Second, Philip Alt-
bach has noted that "a balanced perspective [on how globalization trends influ-
ence education] requires careful analysis of the downside-viewpoints often not
articulated in the rush toward the global future."4
Current scholarship on Chinese higher education suggests three particular
downsides that compromise the ability of Chinese leaders to create and sustain
effective interaction between purposive public policy and "growing expectations
and demands of different stakeholders in society."5 These include the danger to
schools' missions and social relationships ofmanagerialism; the danger to educa-
tional quality of the massification and marketization of schooling; and the dan-
ger to social stability of educational disparity.6
In thinking about these downsides, we have found it helpful to adopt the
strategy of thinking "glocally." Universities in China, like their counterparts
around the world, are simultaneously national and international institutions. 7
We agree with Robert Arnove that the study of higher education necessitates
3. NELLY P. STROMQUIST, EDUCATION IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD, at xxii (2002).
4. Philip G. Altbach, Knowledge and Education as International Commodities: The Collapse of the
Common Good, INT'L HIGHER EDUC., Summer 2002, at 2, 2,availableat http://www.bc.edu/hc-org/
avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/News28/text001 .htm.
5. Mok Ka-Ho, Centralization and Decentralization: Changing Governance in Education, in CEN-
TRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 2, at 3.
6. See id. at 12-13.
7. See generally RUTH HAYHOE, CHINA'S UNIVERSITIES AND THE OPEN DOOR (1989); D. Bruce
Johnstone, Chinese Higher Education in the Context of the Worldwide University Change Agenda,
available at http://www.gse.buffalo.edu/org/IntHigherEdFinance/Chinese/7WebBeijingForum.pdf
(last modified Sept. 30, 2003).
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coming to terms with the "dialectic [that] is at work between the global and the
local." 8 Recently, theorists have employed this insight to create the neologism
"glocalization," sometimes defined as "global localization."9 Glocalization im-
plies a search beyond the contributions and the downsides of globalization in
order to conceptualize a world of greater balance between the potentially em-
powering trends of global communication and the concrete challenges faced by
local communities.' We hope that readers will see in our "glocal" analysis that
specific economic, political, and historical contexts of China are crucial determi-
nants of educational reform processes. Policies that look like, and often are,
responses to globalization are also "pursued within the context of managing
state-building and economic growth in a state-directed (or government-
directed) paradigm of governance."1 '
I. UNIVERSITIES AS THE SPEARHEAD OF GLOCALIZATION
All levels of Chinese education have undergone profound transformation in
the last decade. Public Montessori preschools vie with private international kinder-
gartens for the children of affluent parents; internet connections and international
textbooks, particularly for English language instruction, are available to students
in urban classrooms. A small number of all-girls' secondary schools, both public
and private, are experimenting with gender sensitive curricula. 2 These initiatives
are a direct result of Chinese policymakers, educators, and parents training their
eyes and their minds outward as they attempt to educate their children.
8. Robert F. Arnove, Introduction: Refraining Comparative Education; The Dialectic of the Glo-
bal and the Local, in COMPARATIVE EDUCATION: THE DIALECTIC OF THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL I
(Robert E Arnove & Carlos Alberto Torres eds., 2d ed. 2003) (discussing this dialectic in the field
of comparative and international education) [hereinafter THE DIALECTIC OF THE GLOBAL AND THE
LOCAL].
9. See BARBARA CZARNIAWSKA, A TALE OF THREE CITIES: OR THE GLOCALIZATION OF CITY MAN-
AGEMENT 12 (2003).
10. Some theorists working in this tradition pin their hopes on cities as the human setting most
capable of securing the foundations of human equity, sustainability, and peaceful resolution of
conflict. See THE GLOCAL FORUM, THE GLOCALIZATION MANIFESTO 5 (2004), available at http.//
topics.developmentgateway.org/glocalization/rc/filedownload.do-itemld= 1011133 (last visited Jan.
27, 2005).
11. Mok Ka-Ho, Beyond Decentralization: Changing Roles of the State in Education, in CENTRAL-
IZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 2, at 203, 213.
12. See Heidi Ross, Guest Editor's Introduction, 34 CHINESE EDUC. & Soc'Y 3 (2001).
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Our narrower purpose in this article is to evaluate higher education as China's
"spearhead of globalization."' 3 Our use of the concept "glocalization" cuts across
the grain of much Chinese scholarship on higher education and probes a contra-
diction within it. While the chief foci of that literature include the international-
ization, globalization, and marketization of Chinese education, the underlying
assumption by its scholars "continues to be determined by nation-building and
modernization priorities."14
Specifically, we examine six interrelated trends in Chinese higher educa-
tion. These include rapid expansion and "massification" of the system; the rede-
fined role of the state in decentralization processes; the consolidation and
ranking of universities, including the attempt to build "world class" institutions;
redefinitions of quality learning and teaching; marketization and privatization;
and "new transnationalism." Our particular focus on how these trends shape
private higher education illuminates new stresses in the system, as well as what
happens when neoliberal policies from above, globalization forces from without,
and strong demands for access and accountability from below create a "perfect
storm" for educational transformation.
II. THE EXPANSION AND MASSIFICATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Two global milestones were reported by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at the end of last summer. The
first milestone was that the world's university population had topped 100 mil-
lion. The second milestone was that China had more students studying in post-
secondary institutions than any other nation, including the United States. Over
sixteen million students were studying in China's post-secondary schools, nearly
two and one-half times the 1997 figure. 5
The latter milestone is used by Chinese educational leaders and officials as a
marker of the success of its "reform and opening" policies. Reform and expan-
sion throughout the educational system have become potent domestic measures
13. STROMQUIST, SUpra note 3, at 103.
14. Gloria Davies, Introduction to VOICING CONCERNS: CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CRITICAL IN-
QUIRY 1, 7 (Gloria Davies ed., 2001).
15. When not specifically indicated, all statistics used in this article come from the Chinese Min-
istry of Education. See Ministry of Education P.R.C., 2003 Statistical Report on Education, available
at http://www.moe.edu.cn/stat/tjgongbao/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
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for China's emergence as a global power. It is the rare daily newspaper that does
not headline expanded special and early childhood education facilities; near uni-
versal nine-year compulsory education; breaking the biggest educational bottle-
neck in China's system, senior secondary schools; or the latest distance education
program for adults pursuing a college degree.
Until very recently, China's educational system was described as having a
low center of gravity. Relative to other developing countries, the base of China's
educational pyramid was very broad while the top was very narrow. Three per-
cent of 18 to 22 year olds were studying in tertiary institutions in 1990 compared
to 8 percent in India.' Fewer than one out of every one hundred citizens in 1990
were college graduates, and between 1952 and 1988 this rate probably declined.
The gross enrollment rate of higher education lingered around 2 percent in the
1980s and 3 percent in the early 1990s. 7
Such figures, coupled with China's increased engagement in the global
economy, explain why higher education has entered a period of unprecedented
expansion. In 1999, 4.13 million students were enrolled in 1,100 regular tertiary
institutions, an increase of 770,000 students in one year. Enrollment in adult
higher education was 3.05 million, an increase of almost 250,000. In 2002, 9.03
million students enrolled in 1,396 regular higher education institutions. Over 80
percent of high school graduates in many cities matriculate into post-secondary
institutions.
Higher education gross enrollment rates reached 15 percent of the age co-
hort two years ago, which, according to international standards, marks the tran-
sition from elite to mass higher education.' 8 Expanded higher education
opportunities simultaneously reduced the gap between supply and demand at
the tertiary level and put more pressure on admissions to high schools, which in
2002 accepted only 58.3 percent of junior high school graduates. Structural re-
forms, such as adoption in some universities of the credit system and lifting of
16. See N. Rao et al., Primary Schooling in China and India: Understanding How Socio-Contextual
Factors Moderate the Role of the State, in COMPARATIVE EDUCATION: CONTINUING TRADITIONS, NEW
CHALLENGES, AND NEW PARADIGMS (Mark Bray ed., 2003).
17. See UNESCO, Education for All: The Year 2000 Assessment; Final Country Report of China,
available at http'//www.2.unesco.org/wef/countryreports/china/contents.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2005).
18. China achieved a gross enrollment rate of 15% eight years ahead of the goal set in the state's
Action Plan to Vitalize Education in the 21st Century issued by the Ministry of Education in 1999.
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the age limit of twenty-five years for enrollment in higher education, also
opened Chinese universities to older and part-time students. 9
This "unprecedented expansion" built on gradual growth since 1978.20 In
addition, a number of more recent top-down, bottom-up, and external forces
combined to expand higher education.2' First, the government decided to in-
crease college opportunities and keep costs low by initiating cost recovery mea-
sures to stimulate the domestic economy. Demand by families for higher
education opportunities far outstripped supply, and pragmatic policymakers,
anxious to promote spending among savings-conscious families, understood
that formal education was one of the few "commodities" that would urge par-
ents to loosen their purse strings.22 The Chinese labor market also provided the
younger generation rates of return for tertiary training that were much higher
than those for their parents, a connection families made more rapidly than
scholars. Furthermore, expanding enrollments were related to achievements in
primary and secondary education.23
III. THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE IN DECENTRALIZATION PROCESSES
As higher education has expanded, relationships among the state, society,
individual universities, and students have changed dramatically. Part of this
change is global in nature, reflecting worldwide neoliberal trends in state and
education administration. By neoliberalism we do not mean "decline of the
state" arguments, singularly inappropriate in the Chinese context.24 In fact, one
of the chief characteristics of reform in China is "the state's concerted effort to
make use of the non-state sector and to mobilize market forces to finance educa-
19. See Mok Ka-Ho, Globalisation and Higher Education Restructuring in Hong Kong, Taiwan
and Mainland China, 22 HIGHER EDUC. RES. & DEV. 117 (2003).
20. See Xin Wang, A Policy Analysis of the Financing of Higher Education in China: Two Decades
Reviewed, 23 J. HIGHER EDUC. POL'Y & MGMT 205, 206 (2001).
21. Min Weifang, Economic Transition and Higher Education Reform in China, at 4-5 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.teacherscollege.edu/centers/coce/pdf-files/EconTransitionandHEReform.pdf.
22. Belief in the power of formal education to lead to social mobility is ubiquitous in China. Ed-
ucational expenses get first priority in family budgets and are the fastest growing focus of con-
sumer spending by urban residents. Some economists have speculated that this spending is
increasing at an average rate of about twenty percent annually.
23. See CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 2.
24. See generally STROMQUIST, supra note 3, at 25-31 (discussing the role of the state and neo-
liberalism).
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tion." '2 5 Decentralization and centralization of China's educational system is
happening simultaneously as the state mobilizes "the market, the family, the
third sector and individuals" to regulate social services.
26
That the Chinese state plays a strong guiding role as social and economic "ar-
chitect" and "regulator" will surprise few readers who have followed the processes
and conditions of decentralization worldwide. Decentralization, defined as the
redistribution of power and responsibility, does not necessarily mean that states do
less. 27 It does mean that their role as "education service providers" changes "from
carrying out most of the work of education itself to determining where the work
will be done, by whom and how."28 Indeed, the Chinese state's legitimacy increas-
ingly depends on whether it successfully organizes the education system.
Since 1978, the state's reorganization of education has been primarily to sup-
port the economic policies associated with market socialism. As power was grad-
ually decentralized to lower levels of government during the 1980s, provincial
and local governments were allowed to retain part or most of their revenues and
to decide how to spend them. Furthermore, taxation reform a decade ago codi-
fied legitimate authorities of taxation and helped stabilize incomes of central
and sub-central levels of the government.29 In this context, educational policies
promoting decentralization expanded to include: (1) the reduction of the central
state's regulation, provision, and subsidization of education service; (2) the dev-
olution of responsibility and power to localities; (3) the diversification of re-
sources (i.e., the encouragement of multiple channels of funding, including cost
recovery measures like tuition); and (4) enhanced flexibility and autonomy in
governance of educational institutions.
25. CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION,SUpra note 2, at 208.
26. Mok,supra note 5, at 5-6.
27. A large body of literature carefully examines the differential and sometimes contradictory
processes in Chinese education that were once all labeled "decentralization." Most scholars of Chi-
nese higher education reform use as a springboard for such analyses. Mark Bray's useful distinc-
tion is among them: "de-concentration" (the downward transfer of administrative tasks but not
authority); "delegation" (discretionary transference of decision making power to other entities);
and "devolution" (transference of authority to a unit with the power to act independently). Mark
Bray, Control of Education: Issues and Tensions in Centralization and Decentralization, in THE DIA-
LECTIC OF THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL, supra note 8, at 204,206.
28. Mok,supra note 5.
29. Kai-Ming Cheng, Reforms in the Administration and Financing of Higher Education, in
HIGHER EDUCATION IN POST-MAO CHINA 11, 18 (Michael Agelasto & Bob Adamson eds., 1998)
[hereinafter HIGHER EDUCATION IN POST-MAO CHINA].
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Policies associated with numbers one and two above essentially define the
parameters of education's "bottom line" and have been the most contentious.
Particularly after the Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party on the Reform of the Educational System in 1985, which aimed to reduce ex-
cessive government control and give higher education institutions more auton-
omy, institutions began to generate non-budgetary funds through tuition,
contracts, international assistance, such as World Bank loans, and philanthropic
donations. Once the central government deliberately reduced its role in regulat-
ing, financing, and providing services for higher education, private universities
carved out a space to survive and develop."0
On the ground, students, parents, and teachers had to rapidly adjust to a
changing culture of schooling that emphasized private investment over public
good. "Cradle to grave" housing, education, and health services for university
staff and faculty were cut back as universities contracted out services. While the
number of university students increased 3.2 times from 1992 to 1999, the number
of support staff fell 35.3 percent. Student services and financial aid were at the
forefront of change. National, provincial, city, and institutional measures to help
students afford college accompanied increases in tuition. Universities began to
offer teaching and research assistantships, and The People's Bank of China, the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Ministry of Education, the Min-
istry of Finance, and other institutions began supporting national student loan
programs. As families absorbed an increasing share of college costs, graduates
gained flexibility in job choice and place of residence. 31
From the perspective of the college administrator, decentralization meant
that universities had to raise the majority of their operating funds, sometimes as
much as 80 percent, from nongovernmental sources (research grants, tuition,
gifts, sale of services, income from university-run enterprises). Yet, the state re-
mained in control of enrollment, tuition, and faculty positions, keeping out of
the hands of administrators the power over a significant portion of both income
and expenses. Although individual campuses began to create their own curric-
ula, the Ministry of Education still approved all major concentrations.
30. See JING LIN, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND PRIVATE EDUCATION IN CHINA 5-6 (1999).
31. Minzuan Zhang, Changing Conceptions of Equity and Student Financial Support Policies, in
HIGHER EDUCATION IN POST-MAO CHINA,supra note 29, at 249.
"GLocALIZING" CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION
At present, Chinese states "remain the most influential actors in shaping
local education policy formulation and directing educational development."
32
Yet, "pressure for restructuring and reforming education is increasingly driven
by the growing expectations and demands of different stakeholders in society.
" 33
Official policy calls for the state to move from being controller and producer of
social services to becoming the architect of a new, more self-regulating socialist
market and knowledge-based system.
34
IV. CONSOLIDATION, HIERARCHY, AND WORLD-CLASS EDUCATION
Expansion and decentralization of Chinese higher education has sharpened
the status hierarchy of tertiary schools. From 1995 to 1998, China's most presti-
gious institutions competed for inclusion in Project 211-100 institutions form-
ing the core of China's world-class knowledge system, with distinguished chairs,
competitive salaries, and high-tech parks and research grants to promote schol-
arship and university-enterprise collaboration. Guidelines for restructuring uni-
versities were to change the "obsolete" pattern under which universities were
owned and run by a variety of central ministries. Such guidelines also establish a
relatively decentralized, two-tiered management system in which administra-
tive powers would be shared by both central and local governments, but with the
local governments playing a major role. 35
Mergers were to improve economies of scale and also act as a fast track to
world-class standards. From 1998 to 2000, 387 colleges and universities were
consolidated into 212. By 2001, the Ministry of Education had reduced from 200
to 71 (about 3.5 percent of China's public universities) the number of institutions
it operated and provided them with additional funding.
The desire for reaching world-class standards is widespread in China and
has impacted high-profile activities from producing world-class athletes who
compete for gold medals on the Olympic stage to the aspirations of China's
metropoles, such as Shanghai, to become world-class cities. Significantly, educa-
tion is at the core of the world-class city concept. World-class cities are envi-
32. CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 2, at 203.
33. Mok, supra note 5.
34. See Ministry of Education, Action Plan for Vitalizing Education for the 21st Century, available
at http://www.moe.edu.cn.
35. See Cheng, supra note 29, at 23.
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sioned as "centers" for international economic interests, finance and trade, and
learning. Shanghai's road to becoming a "Learning City" has engaged leaders in
discussions about lifelong education, all-around personal development, and sat-
isfying public demand for education.36 Shanghai provides a mirror for the future
of higher education in China. When its higher education gross enrollment rate
exceeded 40 percent, a number of officials raised concerns about maintaining
educational quality and about the under-employment of college graduates.
Those fears, as we see below, are now national in scope.
Comparative educators are generally skeptical of high-profile attempts to
build world-class universities.37 Nevertheless, the world-class concept has one im-
portant benefit: "[I]t is focusing attention on academic standards and improvement,
and on the roles of universities in society, and of how academic institutions can fit
in a higher education system within a country and in the global academic uni-
verse."38 These questions, which consume the attention of administrators at pre-
mier and mid-level institutions in China, are typically labeled issues of "quality."
V. CONCERNS ABOUT QUALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF
MASSIFICATION AND GLOCALIZATION
Gerard Postiglione has correctly noted that in China "[t]here is an abiding
faith in and appeal to international standards (guojijiegui) as a means of salva-
tion within the new economy."39 A school in Beijing, for example, describes
quality education as a toehold for cultivating creative twenty-first century inter-
nationalized thinkers.4" However, glocalization has complicated educators' un-
derstandings of educational quality (suzhi) and how to improve it. Commonly,
quality is defined in China holistically as the cultivation of citizens with high-
level academic skills, the capacity to think critically, and "virtue."41 Virtue usu-
36. Interviews with Officers of the Shanghai Bureau of Education (June 2004).
37. See, e.g., Philip G. Altbach, The Costs and Benefits of World-Class Universities, INT'L HIGHER
EDUC., Fall 2003, at 5, 8, available at http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/News33/
text003.htm.
38. Id.
39. Gerard Postiglione, Universities for Knowledge Economies: Hong Kong and the Chinese Main-
land Within Globalization and Decentralization, in CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION, supra
note 2, at 157, 162-63.
40. See Beijing Shu Ren Private School, at www.shuren.org/engvision/.
41. See Heidi A. Ross & Jing Lin, Schools of Goodwill in China: Helping Poor Students Succeed, 39
J. OF THOUGHT 131, 133-35 (2004).
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ally translates to moral responsibility, humanistic concern, and a regard for Chi-
nese cultural traditions, all of which seem to the Chinese public to be eroding
away in a globalizing age. At the university level, one interesting and under-
analyzed example of such thinking is implied in China's 1999 Plan to Build up
Key National Bases for Humanities and Social Sciences Research in Regular
Higher Education Institutions. Just over 100 leading research centers were iden-
tified for the program, which is creating new multidisciplinary programs to
study some of China's most pressing social needs.
4 2
China's rapid expansion of private schools, to which we now turn in more
detail, has ratcheted up concerns about quality. Many private schools lack ade-
quate funding, qualified teachers, and students. Systems of accreditation and
oversight are in their infancy.43 In addition, as the job market for college gradu-
ates becomes more competitive, the media, policymakers, and parents are more
carefully scrutinizing college programs. Furthermore, college graduates must
now find their own employment. More than 2.8 million students graduated
from Chinese universities last summer, and the Ministry of Education has re-
ported that about 30 percent of these students will not find immediate employ-
ment. In response, institutions of higher education are pressed to "prove" the
value of their degrees and provide greater support to job-seeking graduates.
This year, the state has also stepped back in, through a highly symbolic "start
and improve your business" program, to urge university graduates to "become
their own bosses.
44
While the debate about what Chinese universities should be doing and do
continues, students are arriving on the doorsteps of unaccredited institutions by
the millions. It is highly unlikely that the problem of quality teaching and learn-
ing will be solved any time soon. "[Qluality assurance will be up to a professori-
ate in China that is generally under paid, a college and university administration
that is focused on financing the expansion, and a government education appara-
tus that has begun to transfer more autonomy and responsibility to individual
institutions."
45
42. Interviews with faculty at Tsinghua University (June 2004).
43. See LIN, supra note 30.
44. Interviews with higher education faculty in four institutions in Beijing (2004).
45. Postiglione,supra note 39, at 165.
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VI. THE MARKETIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Despite continued expansion of higher education, supply still lags behind
demand.46 Parental demand for education is one of the reasons private institu-
tions have received so much bottom-up support since their re-emergence in the
1980s. This demand has exacerbated the State's relationship with private univer-
sities, which has been, at best, "affirmative but also contradictory,"47 and "en-
couraging with great cautions."48
By 2001, eighty-nine private higher education institutions had been accred-
ited by the Ministry of Education to offer degrees and diplomas. In 2002, China's
1,396 regular colleges and universities (with an enrollment of nine million stu-
dents) included 133 accredited private institutions, which enrolled a total of
320,000 students. An additional 1,202 non-accredited private higher education
institutions enrolled 1.4 million students.
Is the emergence of private universities on such a large scale a sign of priva-
tization? A number of scholars argue convincingly that privatization, the trans-
fer of ownership or administration from public to private sectors, is not an
accurate description of the Chinese context.49 Instead, private universities were
established in China independent from the public sector, receiving neither fi-
nancial support from the state nor a clear legal framework in which to operate.
Consequently, to describe the rise of private universities in China we prefer the
broader term marketization. While the idea of a "free market" is based upon
principles such as private ownership, private management, private production
and distribution of goods, and the retention of profit in private hands, the pro-
cess of marketization may or may not involve privatization. Marketization
46. China's institutions of higher education include regular and adult higher education. The
regular sector includes four-year and three-year specialized programs, leading to a bachelor's de-
gree and diploma, respectively. Adult higher education consists of two- and four-year diploma
granting programs. Self-study higher education programs are also available. Students who fail to
enter four-year, degree-granting institutions have several options, including specialized colleges
or vocational-technical colleges with two- or three-year diploma granting programs. Private
schools provide another option. See Johnstone, supra note 7.
47. LIN,supra note 30, at 156.
48. H. H. Zhao, An Analysis of China's People-run Schools (2004) (Unpublished paper presented
at the Comparative International Educational Society Annual Conference, Mar. 8-12, Salt Lake
City).
49. See, e.g., Julia Kwong, Introduction: Marketization and Privatization in Education, 20 INT'L J.
OF EDuC. DEv. 87 (2000); see also CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 2.
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refers, then, to the adoption of market practices and criteria such as profit, af-
fordability, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and customer choice in pub-
lic sectors like education.
The "Supply" and "Demand" of China's Education Market
A review of the research on marketization of Chinese education indicates
that the return, growth, and development of private institutions are the result of
multiple "glocal" forces. The expansion of private schools was fueled on the supply
side as "[e]ntrepreneurial educators entered the market to make a profit when a
scarcity of educational opportunities existed."5 As education became perceived
as a private investment, private schools of all types became more popular because
of their willingness to accommodate: (1) the needs of "failed students" who had
not passed the college entrance examination and sought a second chance to at-
tend college; (2) the desire of students for marketable "hot skills" like foreign
language and computer competencies; (3) the hopes of urban parents who
sought elite alternatives to state schools to give their single children a leg up in
what was an increasingly competitive job market; (4) the limited means of rural
students who sought a cheaper local alternative to increasingly expensive non-
local public compulsory education; and (5) the inability or unwillingness of the
state to pay for the growing demand for quality education.
For decades, China has been criticized for what both international agencies
and the state's own officers have criticized as disproportionately low investments
in education. In 1998 to 1999, when rapid expansion of higher education grabbed
the country's attention, China ranked 145th out of 153 nations in terms of per-
capita education spending. Although national policy prescribed government
educational expenditures of 4 percent of GDP in 2000, the figure was 2.5 per-
cent, virtually unchanged since the 1950s.5
We have mentioned above the significance to marketization of the state's
primary financing strategies: financial decentralization, in which financing re-
sponsibility is delegated to local governments, and resource diversification, in
which both governmental and non-governmental resources are mobilized for
50. Julia Kwong, The Reemergence of Private Schools in Socialist China, 41 COMP. EDuc. REv. 244,
257(1997).
51. See Education for All: The Year 2000 Assessment; Final Country Report of China, supra note 17,
at § 5.1.
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Table 1. Funding sources for higher education (1978-1994) (billion yuan, 1 us dollar=about 8.3 yuan)
Year GDP Total Gov Total Gov. Total Gov. expenditure on
Gov. revenue as expenditure expenditure higher ed as % of
revenue % of GDP on higher ed total Gov.
expenditure
1978 358.80 123.30 34.4 122.50 1.50 1.2
1979 399.80 126.30 31.6 146.90 2.32 1.6
1980 447.60 131.60 29.4 146.20 2.81 1.9
1982 518.20 141.20 27.2 148.30 3.44 2.3
1984 692.80 183.20 26.5 193.90 5.22 2.7
1986 968.80 244.60 25.2 263.30 7.20 2.7
1988 1,407.40 280.30 19.9 313.70 8.20 2.6
1990 1,856.40 355.00 19.1 391.70 8.90 2.3
1992 2,665.60 392.80 14.7 453.90 11.80 2.6
1994 4,500.60 521.80 11.6 579.30 18.60 3.2
Source: China Educational Statistical Yearbook, 1978-1994 (Wang, 2001, P. 20)
public services like education. Although the state did not at first explicitly sup-
port the re-emergence of private higher education, decentralization and diversi-
fication policies provided room for private education to return, grow, and
eventually be formally recognized in policy and law as a supplement to public
higher education. The state's reluctant recognition of the legitimacy of private
higher education was both a response to national needs and a reflection of the
state's policy to let market forces constrain public services. 2
Private education also received a significant boost from powerful bottom-
up social forces. Since 1978, the breathtaking transformation of China's econ-
omy has required a greater diversity of trained young people. At the same time,
the booming domestic economy, with an annual GDP increase of nearly 10 per-
cent over two decades, has greatly increased national income (see Table 2). In ad-
dition, the Chinese government has pursued policies that have facilitated
redistribution of income more favorable to individual families. In the late 1970s
and early 1980s, about 30 percent of GDP was state revenue, 25 percent went to
enterprises, and 45 percent went to individual families. By the mid-1990s, only
10 percent went to the state, 20 percent went to enterprises, and 70 percent went
to individual families. 3
The gap between the great demand for higher education and the incapabil-
ity of public institutions to satisfy it built a solid market niche for private educa-
tion and substantially stimulated its growth. Investing in private education also
served as an incentive for "educational entrepreneurs" to establish private
52. See LIN,supra note 30, at 146-55.
53. Weifang, supra note 21, at 12-13.
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Table 2. Annual per capita income, 1980 to 1999 Unit: Yuan (1 Dollar-approximately 8.3 Yuan)











Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China, 2000
schools. Although private universities may not legally generate private profits
(i.e., all gains must be reinvested into education), virtually all private university
leaders have been involved in profit-taking schemes.54 Publications, with titles
like A Place for Profit in China, are ubiquitous in the domestic and international
media and refer to the lucrative business of private universities in China.
Top-down, bottom-up, and supply/demand factors propelling the develop-
ment of private education, as well as the changing role of the state in education
planning, reflect a number of global decentralization and recentralization pat-
terns. Adopting variants of neoliberal policies, nation-states around the world
have been shifting fiscal responsibility for higher education from central to lower
levels of government and from the public to the private sector through the diver-
sification of resources.55 As a result, the higher education sector generally receives
much less direct financial support from central governments than it did during
the 1960s and 1970s. In turn, as institutions of higher education pay more of their
own way they have become more diverse, creating missions tailored to the needs
of their constituencies.
VII. THE CONFLICTING MISSIONS OF PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION IN CHINA
At their most basic, the missions of universities can be classified as eco-
nomic, political, cultural, and social.56 The economic mission of Chinese univer-
54. LiN, supra note 30, at 159-61.
55. See Bray, supra note 27, at 204-224.
56. See, e.g., Torsten Hus~n, The Idea of the University: Changing Roles, Current Crisis, and Future
Challenges,in HICHER EDUCATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: CRITICAL ISSUES 3 (Zaghloul
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sities in the era of market socialism has been to sustain and stimulate national
economic development by training highly qualified citizens and by providing
innovation in science and technology." The political mission of Chinese univer-
sities includes the education of citizens with both a strong sense of national iden-
tity and a world perspective. The cultural mission, to engage the Chinese
citizenry in the knowledge of its civilization and of humanity, is essentially a
question of what is most worth knowing. Clarifying the relative importance and
interrelationship of the local and the global is fundamental to both political and
cultural missions, and represents a particular challenge in China, where the
state's aim is to integrate students as future elites into the current political sys-
tem, assuring its future.5
8
Finally, the most critical social mission of Chinese universities, in the fa-
mous words of Carnegie, is to create "ladders upon which the aspiring can rise."
Market socialism has widened the gap between China's haves and have nots.
Currently, China ranks in the bottom third of the world's countries in terms of
income distribution.59 Its GINI coefficient (a measure of income distribution
that rates economies between zero for absolute income equality and one for ab-
solute inequality) has risen from 0.18 percent in 1978 to 0.51 percent in 2002. The
need for Chinese universities to critically evaluate the redistributive power of
glocalization has never been more pressing.
A. Economic Missions
Private universities in China are noted for addressing a limited economic mis-
sion. One of their perceived advantages is flexibility in responding to the needs of
enterprises and the demands of labor markets. Private universities primarily offer
"hot" majors like economics, finance, and computer science to attract students de-
sirous of marketable skills and credentials. Yet, while private universities attribute
their success to their adaptation to market demands, their problems also stem from
this adaptation. Because the survival of private institutions relies on student tuition
Morsy & Philip G. Altbach eds., 1996); UNIVERSITIES AND GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
(Jan Currie & Janice Newson eds., 1998); Marek Kwiek, Globalization and Higher Education, 26
HIGHER EDUC. IN EUR. 27 (2001).
57. See Action Plan to Vitalize Education in the 21st Century, supra note 18.
58. See HAYHOE, supra note 7, at 9.
59. See Human Development Reports, China, available at http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/
cty/cty_fCHN.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
"GLoCALIZING" CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION
and enrollment, private universities privilege instrumental knowledge and low-
cost, quick-return courses, neglect basic science and humanities, and then, by def-
inition, fail to live up to their promise of being "real" universities."0
B. Political and Cultural Missions
In terms of the formal curriculum, most private universities have paid little
attention to their political and cultural missions. The curriculum is dominated
by fairly narrowly defined skills training, with the exception of classes in politi-
cal ideology. Humanities courses remain undeveloped because they are consid-
ered "cold" in the higher education market. However, private universities'
peripheral status, precarious financing, and need to closely monitor and respond
to the concerns of parents have resulted in a strong implicit curriculum driven
by the need to insure student safety and the ideological status quo. The desire to
maintain harmonious working relations with government officials who are
often distrustful of private institutions, as well as to assure parents that their
money is being well spent, thwarts the "flexible spirit of innovation" that is
lauded as the primary advantage of private institutions.
Finally, we have noted that private higher education has greatly expanded
the scale of higher education in China. In 2002, private universities educated
1.72 million of the 10.4 million students enrolled in the regular higher education
sector. However, private universities usually charge fairly high tuition and fees
that are affordable only by students from middle-class or affluent families. Ac-
cording to the state's figures, 13 percent of urban families belong to the "middle
class," the definition for which is an annual income of 100,000 yuan or about
$1,200 a month. That amount is almost five times the average income of individ-
uals in Shanghai, China's wealthiest metropolis.
In sum, private universities generally fall short of fulfilling the overall mis-
sions of universities. In this context, there are questions to be asked of the central
government. How much weight will policymakers (and state regulations) give
to the private higher education sector in the next few years? Will private higher
education remain the "step-kid" of the Ministry of Education?6' If the state de-
60. See generally Jing Lin, Private Higher Education in China: A Contested Terrain, 36 INT'L
HIGHER EDUC. 17, 17-18 (2004), available at http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/
News36/text010.htm.
61. LIN,supra note 30.
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cides to treat private higher education as a legitimate part of the educational sys-
tem, then it might consider offering private institutions financial support,
particularly for the development of general education and basic science and hu-
manities curricula.
In contrast to the state's affirmative rhetoric, which we would describe as
largely symbolic, state support, especially at local levels, lags far behind. The
state acknowledges it needs private higher education as social demand for edu-
cation continues to grow. But its "suspicion of the private nature of such schools
and its uncertainty about its political effects" is an obstacle to the full integration
of private higher education into the national education system.
62
Jandhyala Tilak's analysis of extreme, strong, moderate, and pseudo-
privatiation efforts worldwide throws a comparative spotlight on the Chinese
state's ambivalence about supporting private higher education.63 "Extreme"
privatization efforts refer to near total privatization of the higher education sector
with little intervention by a government. "Strong" privatization efforts refer to
the recovery of the full costs of public higher education. "Moderate" privatization
efforts refer to public provision of higher education with a reasonable level of fi-
nancing from nongovernmental sources. Finally, "pseudo-privatization" efforts
refer to higher education institutions that are privately managed but government-
aided.' Only moderate efforts produce consistently promising results, primarily
because they support cost-sharing and communication among states, families, and
S1 65
societies.
Tilak's conclusion assumes that higher education is a quasi-private good. In
general, this description fits the Chinese context. In 2002, China's first Private
Education Law was promulgated with great fanfare and high expectations. Un-
fortunately, the law has since come to be viewed as "a double-edged sword, aim-
ing both to promote and regulate private [education]. ' 66 In a recent review of the
condition of private higher education in China, Jing Lin reported that just over
a year ago, "participants at a conference in Nanjing bemoaned the fact that the
62. Zhao, supra note 48, at 19.
63. Jandhyala B. G. Tilak, The Privatization of Higher Education, in HIGHER EDUCATION IN AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 56, at 59.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Fengqiao Yan & Daniel C. Levy, China's New Private Education Law, INT'L HIGHER EDUC.,
Spring 2003, at 9, 10, available at http//www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/News3l/
text005.htm.
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'winter of private education' had set in."67 Conference delegates argued that the
new law not only failed to clarify and protect the rights and autonomy of private
universities, but also paved "the way for government schools, state banks, and
local governments to combine resources to edge out private universities."68 The
leaders of private universities chafe under restrictions that prevent them from
admitting students until after public institutions do and prevent them from issu-
ing degrees. They feel undermined as public universities, using public resources,
set up profit-making "second-tier colleges" that will compete for their potential
students. They see the rise of second-tier colleges as a clear violation of the 2002
law, which establishes that private schools and universities are to be privately es-
tablished and administered.69
Faced with mixed messages from the state regarding their value and legiti-
macy, private universities must develop clearer missions. One well-known private
university in Shaanxi Province, aspiring to a position of leadership and eventually
to numbering among one of China's prestigious universities, has gone farther than
most private universities in this process. The university's short term aim is to pro-
vide its students a general education and a campus culture that creates for students
a "happy home." The institution's three-pronged strategy includes: (1) placing
limits on quantitative development (the rapid expansion of enrollment to bring in
tuition income that was the key to their survival in the past decade) in favor of
quality; (2) emphasizing market-oriented professional and low-cost majors, while
trying to provide students with a general education that includes concentrations
in the arts and sciences; and (3) balancing the desires of parents and students and
the regulatory hand of the state in order to create a safe, yet relaxed, campus cul-
ture that allows for student exploration and self-management.
VIII. PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE
DISTRIBUTIVE OUTCOMES OF GLOCALIZATION
China has made the largest single contribution to global poverty reduction of
any country in the last two decades.7" Nevertheless, during that same period, China
67. Lin, supra note 60, at 17-18.
68. Id.
69. Interview with private university presidents in Shaanxi Province, China (June 2004).
70. See WORLD BANK, CHINA: COUNTRY ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM: PROMOTING GROWTH WITH
EQUITY, at ii (2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org.cn/English/Content/cem%202003-
en.pdf(last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
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also experienced the most rapid increase in income disparity of any country ever
tracked by the World Bank. This paradox regarding the distributive outcomes of
market socialism presents Chinese educators and policy makers a significant con-
text for deliberating whether universities, vital to the stability of society, can help
fulfill the state's commitment to equality of social and educational opportunities.
As higher education prices itself out of the reach of many Chinese families,
the public has begun to question just whom universities are supposed to serve.7'
Enrollment corruption scandals at prestigious public universities have drawn
the ire of the public.72 A widely publicized incident at Beijing University of Avi-
ation and Aerospace involved two professors who demanded that a father pay
100,000yuan before his daughter was admitted. Private universities are also vul-
nerable to strong criticism, not only because of their high tuitions and unabashed
profit-seeking, but also because many have built sprawling campuses by buying
up the land of farmers and village schools, disrupting the lives and education of
poorer rural citizens.
By the end of the 1990s, all college students had to pay their own tuition.73
Although estimates vary, Rui Yang calculates that at that time:
[W]hen student fees were still relatively low, a student needed at
least 10,000 to 10,500 yuan annually for a 10-month academic year,
already an astronomical amount for many families. A survey in
Shandong showed that only 8.01 percent of families could cope
with the whole amount on their own, 22.43 percent could only
manage half, 43.68 percent could afford less than one-third, and
10.2 percent felt absolutely helpless.74
71. China has made some important quantitative strides in opening up higher education. For
example, the last decade has seen an increase in participation of girls and women at every level of
schooling. For the first time, in 2000, the proportion of female students in colleges exceeded 40%.
Girls outnumber boys as first year college students in Shanghai and in Beijing.
72. See Wu Zhong, Lessons in Greed, THE STANDARD, Aug. 23, 2004, available at http://www.
thestandard.com.hk/hestandard/..%5Cthestandard%5Ccolumndetailframecol.cfm ?colid=
7&articleid=387.
73. See JAMIL SALMI, STUDENT LOANS IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE WORLD BANK Ex-
PERIENCE (1999), available at http.//www l.worldbank.org/educationAifelong-learning/publications/
studentloans.pdf(last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
74. Yang Rui, Lost Opportunities in the Massification of Higher Education in China, INT'L HIGHER
EDUC., Summer 2002, at 16, 17, available at http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/
News28/text009.htm.
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Student loan programs, first developed by the state in the 1980s to serve fi-
nancially disadvantaged students, are available to a growing number of stu-
dents. Commercial banks also provide loans to students. Yet, the lack of both an
effective personal credit system and a tradition of borrowing have hampered the
promotion of student loans.75
Recently, sensational media reports about "how college becomes a killer"
have documented the tragic costs of the unequal distribution of higher educa-
tion. Some of the stories are about students who take their own lives when their
dreams of higher education are smashed by poverty. Other stories feature des-
perate parents who, unable to fund their children's tuition "atone for their guilt"
by committing suicide.76 Sun Shoujun, a farmer in northeastern China, left a
sober note to his son before drinking pesticide.77 Jing Tongshi was unable to pay
his daughter's tuition and likewise poisoned himself.78 A Beijing mother, unable
to find money for her daughter Zhang Xi, stood outside a local hospital holding
a placard reading, "For sale: my kidney for my daughter's tuition.
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Comparative educators sometimes argue that:
[tihere exists much more political and even financial space for
governments to condition the way globalization is brought into
education than is usually admitted .... That states generally
choose not to be responsive to more equitable versions of knowl-
edge production is at least partly the result of ideological prefer-
ence rather than helplessness in the face of new competitive
pressures and new, globalized thinking. 80
China presents a case in point. While devolution of authority in the gover-
nance of higher education has increased educational opportunities and flexibil-
ity, it has also allowed the state to pass the buck on stubborn social justice issues.
75. See Li Yong-Yan, College Education: A Luxury That Can Take Your Life, SOUTH CHINA






80. MARTIN CARNOY, GLOBALIZATION AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM: WHAT PLANNERS NEED TO
KNOW 83 (1999).
HEIDI Ross AND JINGJING Lou
IX. THE STATE, HIGHER EDUCATION, INTELLECTUALS,
AND THE "NEw TRANSNATIONALISM"
The commodification of education will have major implications
for how we think about schooling and the university, the owner-
ship and transmission of knowledge, and indeed the role of citi-
zenship in modern society. The implications are immense, both
for nations and for the globalization and internationalization of
education.
81
The glocal forces that exacerbate social and educational disparities in China
will thrive in an era of new "transnational higher education, in which academic
institutions from one country operate in another."82 China has become a key
player in global educational entrepreneurship. Chinese parents send their chil-
dren abroad to be educated by the tens of thousands.83 Chinese universities are
marketing Chinese language and culture programs aggressively to international
students desirous of a study abroad experience in China.84 Foreign institutions
are eagerly setting up shop in China, managing jointly-run degree programs
and franchising degrees to Chinese institutions. The speed at which Chinese
universities have internationalized has caused one observer to remark that
"China is perhaps the world's most complex, overhyped, and underanalyzed
market for transnational higher education."
85
Of course, glocalization trends have also positively shaped education. Poli-
cies to strengthen the humanities and social sciences in China are a direct result
of the internationalization of higher education. The Chinese state, supported by
the World Bank, continues its policies of turning China's brain drain into a
"brain gain."86 Over 60,000 Chinese students study in the United States. Their
ability to communicate in English and Chinese is shaping global patterns of the
81. Altbach,supra note 4.
82. Philip G. Altbach, Higher Education Crosses Borders: Can the United States Remain the Top
Destination for Foreign Students?, CHANGE, MARJAPR. 2004, at 18, 22.
83. Yang Rui, China's Entry into the WTO and Higher Education, INT'L HIGHER EDUC., Summer
2001, at 9, 9, available at http://www.bc.edu/bcorg/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/ihe-pdf/ihe24.pdf.
84. See id.
85. Richard Garrett, Foreign Higher Education Activity in China, INT'L HIGHER EDUc., Winter 2004,
at 21, 21, available at http.//www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/News34/text0l 2.htm.
86. Five special issues of Chinese Education and Society have been devoted to this subject during
the last 4 years.
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production of knowledge, not only in science and technology but increasingly in
the social sciences and humanities.
China's reform and opening era has been characterized as a struggle to bal-
ance the needs of two civilizations, one spiritual, one material. Education is con-
ceptualized as part of spiritual civilization, and an underpinning of a new social
ethos that could ameliorate the negative social, moral, and environmental conse-
quences of the strong nation, get-rich-is-glorious forces of market socialism. At
the urging of Jiang Zemin, who introduced the concept in 2002, China's consti-
tution was amended this year to include a third category called "political civili-
zation."87 Will "political civilization"-still vaguely conceived but alluding to
the rule of law, human rights, and increased democratic participation-inscribe
a space, separate from, but overlapping, the material and spiritual domains, in
which Chinese universities might redefine public initiative and social action?
Nelly Stromquist argues that "[t]he university's attainment of its positive
potential will require a social protagonism most intellectuals have seldom had to
engage in."" Whether Chinese intellectuals might rise to this challenge remains
to be seen. It is striking how relatively relaxed Chinese educators and policy-
makers have been regarding the marketization of schooling. Most seem to ac-
cept at face value that universities must serve as "coordinators for further global
economic integration."89 To date, few Chinese academics have devoted their
scholarship to testing the premise that "[g]lobalization might create more chal-
lenges than opportunities for China" or that "[t]here is danger in failing to make
a conscious decision to resist, negotiate, and transform globalization practices. ' 9°
This lack of critical evaluation of the processes of glocalization might be ex-
plained by the social context in which higher education reform began. David
Zweig has argued that reforms came first from the central government, but
"[1]ike water to a man dying of thirst, global resources offered China's universi-
ties and intellectuals resuscitation, rejuvenation, and even a source of life for
new organizations."'" Wang Yuechuan takes a different approach by examining
87. See generally CAO SIYUAN, THE ABC's OF POLITICAL CIVILIZATION: A COMPENDIUM OF CHI-
NESE POLITICAL REFORMS 1 (2003) (discussing the concept of political civilization), available at
http://www.cipe.org/pdf/publications/fs/cao.pdf.
88. STROMQUIST, SUpra note 3, at 130.
89. Postiglione, supra note 39, at 157.
90. Yang, supra note 83, at 9, 10.
91. DAVID ZWEIG, INTERNATIONALIZING CHINA, DOMESTIC INTERESTS AND GLOBAL LINKAGES 162
(1992).
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the legitimation crisis Chinese intellectuals have faced as their role in Chinese
society has shifted from sometimes vital, sometimes paralyzed social conscience
to entrepreneur in a world of corporate managerialism. 2 Although a recent
comparative survey of academics indicated that relative to their counterparts
worldwide, university professors in China have "a stronger sense of professional
obligation to apply their knowledge to serve society,"" Wang concludes that, in
today's China, "there are perhaps only professionals, no intellectuals."
94
We would argue that Wang's assertion is premature. However, the time has
arrived for a critical review by China's leading scholars of the missions of higher
education and the "values of the national and social common good that must be
protected and preserved in a globalized educational environment."95
92. See VOICING CONCERNS: CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CRITICAL INQUIRY 38 (Gloria Davies ed.,
2001).
93. Gerard A. Postiglione & Jiang Minghe, Academic Culture in Shanghai's Universities, INT'L
HIGHER EDUC., Fall 1999, at 12, 13, available at http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/
NewsI 7/text7.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
94. VOICING CONCERNS: CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CRITICAL INQUIRY, supra note 92.
95. Altbach, supra note 4, at 2.
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